

Remuneration report

of Jungheinrich AG for financial year

2025

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About this document

We have optimised the PDF version of our this document for PCs and tablets. The landscape format with individual page view is better suited for viewing on a monitor. The links in the table of contents enable the reader to navigate all chapters quickly and easily. Useful links and standardised function buttons on each page make it easier for the reader to reference sections and present its contents in a more user-friendly and transparent manner.

Jungheinrich AG remuneration report for financial year 2025

PREAMBLE

The remuneration report explains in detail the remuneration granted and owed to former and active members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board of Jungheinrich Aktiengesellschaft (Jungheinrich AG) in financial year 2025. It complies with the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act and also contains voluntary disclosures, in particular on target remuneration.

I. REMUNERATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

A. General principles of the remuneration system

The Supervisory Board of Jungheinrich is responsible for the remuneration system and for determining the remuneration of the individual members of the Board of Management. It is supported in this by the Personnel Committee, which prepares the decisions of the Supervisory Board and the review of the appropriateness of the remuneration level.

The aim of the remuneration system is to support the achievement of the strategic goals of Jungheinrich and to ensure appropriate remuneration for the members of the Board of Management. In line with the corporate strategy of Jungheinrich, the remuneration system incentivises profitable growth and the creation of sustainable value. Long-term variable remuneration exceeds short-term variable remuneration in order to emphasise the particular importance of the long-term development of Jungheinrich.

As approved by the Annual General Meeting 2024, the remuneration system continued to apply in financial year 2025. The

Supervisory Board regularly reviews the remuneration system and makes adjustments if necessary.

The remuneration report for financial year 2024, jointly issued by the Board of Management and Supervisory Board in accordance with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act, was presented to the ordinary Annual General Meeting for approval and approved with 100 per cent of the votes without reservations. The Board of Management and Supervisory Board do not see any fundamental need for amendments or adjustments to the remuneration report. However, minor adjustments were made to the presentation of the remuneration report for 2025 in order to improve readability and comprehension.

B. Remuneration system in financial year 2025


The remuneration of the members of the Board of Management of Jungheinrich comprised non-performance-related and performance-related remuneration components. The main components of the remuneration system are summarised in the figure below:

Remuneration components of Jungheinrich			Strategic alignment
Non-performance-related remuneration	Basic remuneration	Fixed remuneration paid as monthly payments	Forms the basis for attracting and retaining highly qualified members of the Board of Management to develop and implement the strategy
	Fringe benefits	Primarily company car and insurance policies	
	Pension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Fixed annual maintenance payment for members of the Board of Management appointed from 2024 onwards ■ Defined benefit commitment for members of the Board of Management who were first appointed before 2024 	
Performance-related remuneration	Short-term variable remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Plan type: Target bonus ■ Performance criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 45 % Group EBT return on sales – 35 % increase in Group revenue – 20 % lithium-ion equipment ratio ■ Discretionary factor of 0.8 to 1.2 ■ Payment cap: 150 % of target amount ■ Term: One year 	Rewarding the operational implementation of the corporate strategy within a financial year
	Long-term variable remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Plan type: Virtual-performance share plan ■ Performance criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 60 % return on capital employed (ROCE) – 20 % relative total shareholder return (TSR) compared with an individual peer group – 20 % sustainability target ■ Discretionary factor of 0.8 to 1.2 ■ Payment cap: 180 % of target amount ■ Term: Three years 	Incentivising sustainable growth and long-term increases in the value of Jungheinrich as well as aligning interests between investors and members of the Board of Management
Malus / Clawback		Option to reduce or reclaim variable remuneration on a pro rata basis in the event of significant, deliberate or grossly negligent breaches of duty	Ensuring responsible corporate governance for Jungheinrich
Maximum remuneration		Limit on total remuneration granted for one financial year in accordance with Section 87a, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2, Item 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Chair of the Board of Management: €3,500,000.00 ■ For each ordinary member of the Board of Management: €2,300,000.00 	Limit on remuneration to a level that has a motivating effect on the members of the Board of Management, but is not inappropriate
Severance cap		Severance equal to the total of basic remuneration, STI and LTI for two years at a maximum or the remainder of the term of office at a maximum	Limit on amount of severance that can be paid in the event of severance

1. Remuneration structure

The remuneration structure of the target direct remuneration comprises the basic remuneration and the target amounts of the short-term variable remuneration (STI) and long-term variable remuneration (LTI). The variable remuneration accounts for roughly half of the target direct remuneration, with the long-term variable remuneration exceeding the short-term variable remuneration.

Remuneration structure of Board of Management members



excluding fringe benefits and pension

If the company pension and fringe benefits are also taken into consideration, the result is the target total remuneration. The portion of the individual remuneration components within the target total remuneration can be found in the table showing the target remuneration of the Board of Management in chapter I. C. 1.

2. Basic remuneration

The basic remuneration is a fixed amount that is paid as twelve monthly amounts irrespective of the performance of Jungheinrich. As part of the non-performance-related remuneration, it forms the basis for attracting and retaining highly qualified members of the Board of Management who develop and implement the strategy.

3. Fringe benefits

Each member of the Board of Management receives fringe benefits in the form of emoluments in kind and other emoluments. In financial year 2025, fringe benefits for members of the Board of Management include the provision of a company car as well as inclusion of Board of Management members in insurance benefits. The members of the Board of Management are granted accident insurance covering disability and death of the members of the Board of Management, the premiums for which are paid by Jungheinrich for the term of the employment contracts.

In addition, Board of Management members are covered by standard directors and officers liability insurance (referred to as D&O insurance), the excess of which complies with the requirements of company law.

4. Pension

Members of the Board of Management who were first appointed from financial year 2024 onwards are granted a fixed annual maintenance payment, which is paid once a year. These members of the Board of Management can use this pension payment

to manage their pension on an independent basis. Apart from this, these members of the Board of Management are granted no other company pension from Jungheinrich.

In the case of members of the Board of Management who were first appointed from financial year 2024 onwards and were already salaried employees of the Jungheinrich Group before their appointment and therefore have a commitment to receive a company pension, the Supervisory Board can continue this commitment as an exception instead of granting a maintenance payment. No use of this option was made.

For members of the Board of Management who were first appointed before financial year 2024, the pension takes the form of a defined benefit commitment that entitles the member of the Board of Management to a pension payable when they turn 63. The members of the Board of Management are also entitled to a retirement and disability pension as well as support for surviving family members.

Aspect	Specification
Commitment type	Defined benefit commitment
Commencement of pension	End of 63 rd year
Basic amount	€30,000.00 per year
Increase per year on Board of Management	€4,200.00 per year
Payment options	Monthly payment (annual increase of 1%)
Disability/death	Disability: 100 % Death: 50 %

Provisions for pensions and pension expenses for the members of the Board of Management

Provisions for pensions are formed to finance the defined benefit pensions of the members of the Board of Management. For pensions in the form of a maintenance payment, no provisions are formed; however, pension expenses are incurred in the form of a payment to the members of the Board of Management. The pension expenses for financial year 2025 and the present values of the benefits promised to the members of the Board of Management are as follows:

Pension expenses / maintenance payment in financial year 2025

in € thousand	in accordance with IAS 19		
	Service cost	Present value of the pension obligations	Maintenance payment
Active Board of Management members			
Dr Lars Brzoska	77	864	–
Nadine Despineux	–	–	180
Dr Volker Hues	0	1,748	–
Maik Manthey	–	–	180
Heike Wulff	–	–	153
Resigned Board of Management members			
Udo Panenka ¹	–	–	180
Sabine Neuß ²	126	735	–

¹ Resignation of Udo Panenka from the Board of Management on 28 February 2025, end of employment contract on 31 March 2026.

² Resignation of Sabine Neuß from the Board of Management on 30 June 2024, end of employment contract on 31 December 2025.

5. Other event-related remuneration components

To recruit qualified candidates for Board of Management positions, the Supervisory Board of Jungheinrich can grant event-related remuneration as an exception. The Supervisory Board made use of this option when appointing Udo Panenka. As compensation for the loss of his variable remuneration from his previous employer, Udo Panenka was granted a sign-on bonus, payable in three

instalments. An instalment of €100 thousand was payable at the end of 31 December 2024 and 2025, respectively. The third instalment will not be payable due to the termination of his employment contract. In addition, a limited rental cost allowance was granted for a duration of 12 months, payable in instalments over a period of two years. Furthermore, a limited number of flights to and from his place of residence were covered by Jungheinrich.

6. Performance-related remuneration

The following chapters describe the structure of the variable remuneration granted and owed in financial year 2025.

The remuneration granted represents remuneration for which an activity (of one or more years) on which the remuneration is based has been fully performed. Remuneration is owed if Jungheinrich has a legally existing obligation towards the Board of Management member that is due but has not yet been fulfilled.

In addition, the target amounts and system of the long-term incentive (LTI) 2025–2027 are voluntarily presented. The target remuneration is the amount to which the Board of Management members are contractually entitled for financial year 2025 if the agreed performance criteria are met in full (100 per cent target achievement).


6.1. Short-term variable remuneration (STI)

Short-term incentive (STI) 2025

The short-term variable remuneration is based on the currently valid remuneration system and helps secure the long-term development of the company by rewarding work that operationally implements the corporate strategy within a financial year: Success is assessed on the basis of financial and sustainable performance criteria that reflect the strategy and the social and environmental responsibility of Jungheinrich, as well as a discretionary factor.

The target amount forms the basis for the STI and amounts to 45 per cent of the basic remuneration for each member of the Board of Management. The payment of STI is dependent on the weighted overall target achievement, which is determined using “Group EBT return on sales”, “increase in Group revenue” and “lithium-ion equipment ratio”, as well as the specification of a discretionary factor. The target values for the performance criteria are set by the Supervisory Board, and the degree to which they have been achieved is decided by the Supervisory Board after the end of the one-year performance period.

The following illustration shows how the STI functions:



Group EBT return on sales

Group earnings before taxes return on sales (Group EBT return on sales) is the ratio of Group earnings before taxes (EBT) and Group revenue (in each case as per the consolidated financial statements) and is taken into account with a weighting of 45 per cent.

Increase in Group revenue

The increase in Group revenue is the rate of increase in Group revenue for the financial year compared to Group revenue for the previous financial year (in each case as per the consolidated financial statements, adjusted for changes in currency exchange rates) expressed as a percentage. The increase in Group revenue is taken into account with a weighting of 35 per cent.

Lithium-ion equipment ratio

The lithium-ion equipment ratio sustainability target refers to the proportion of selected Jungheinrich Group products equipped with lithium-ion batteries. To determine the target value, the strategic planning for lithium-ion batteries was broken down to financial year 2025. Target achievement was measured by comparing the actual value achieved in financial year 2025 with the target value. A more detailed definition of the performance criterion and the specific values for the lower threshold, the target value, the cap and the actual value are not provided, as in previous years, as this would reveal detailed information about the strategic planning of Jungheinrich to its competition and might put the company at a considerable disadvantage. The lithium-ion equipment ratio is taken into account with a weighting of 20 per cent.

Application of the performance criteria in the STI

In financial year 2025, the Supervisory Board took into consideration the disposal of the Russian subsidiary Jungheinrich Lift Truck 000 as well as the two acquisitions of Invar and Flexstore in the reporting year in accordance with the employment contracts of the Board of Management when calculating the target achievement of the STI. The Supervisory Board hereby assures that the target achievement of the STI is not influenced by

measures that constitute one-off effects. Detailed information on the adjustment of the key figures can also be found in the consolidated financial statements. A comparative calculation of the target achievement before and after the adjustment of the M&A transactions is provided below in the interest of transparent disclosure.

The unadjusted and adjusted actual values as well as the target achievements are presented in the following table:

STI 2025 – Adjustment of the performance criteria for M&A transactions

in %	Group EBT return on sales	Increase in Group revenue
Actual value (unadjusted)	3.56	3.25 ¹
Target achievement (unadjusted)	0.00	82.50
Actual value (adjusted)	5.60	3.23
Target achievement (adjusted)	0.00	82.30

¹ Value already adjusted for changes in foreign exchange rates.


The performance criteria and target values for the performance criteria may not be subsequently changed in principle. The Supervisory Board may take extraordinary developments into account as appropriate in accordance with the recommendation in G.11 of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) in justified exceptional cases that are not related to the Board of Management's performance. It may do so based on its prudent judgement when calculating the degrees of target achievement or by subsequently adjusting the STI target values and performance criteria during the current financial year.

Extraordinary developments include, for example, significant purchases or sales of companies, changes to tax or accounting regulations with substantial effects, and unforeseeable and

far-reaching changes to the economic situation, but not unfavourable market developments. Corresponding adjustments are disclosed in the remuneration report. From the Supervisory Board's point of view, there was no reason to exercise the adjustment options outlined above in the STI in/for financial year 2025.

The degrees of target achievement for the three performance criteria are calculated in line with the following bonus curve, which is interpolated on a linear basis between the threshold value, target value and cap:

Bonus curve – STI



The degrees of target achievement are multiplied by the respective weighting of the performance criterion and then added together to determine the STI weighted overall target achievement.

The specification of the performance criteria at lower threshold, target value and cap as well as the target achievement for the performance criteria in financial year 2025 and the STI target achievement (before applying the discretionary factor) are shown in the following table:

STI 2025 – Specification of the performance criteria & target achievements

in %	Weighting	Lower threshold	Target value	Cap	Actual value 2025	Target achievement 2025
Group EBT return on sales	45	6.2	7.7	9.2	5.60	0.00
Increase in Group revenue	35	0.0	5.0	10.0	3.23	82.30
Lithium-ion equipment ratio	20	No information	No information	No information	No information	109.00
Overall target achievement (weighted)						50.61

Determining the STI payment amount

When determining the STI payment amount, the Supervisory Board can multiply the STI weighted overall target achievement by a factor of between 0.8 and 1.2 in the form of a discretionary decision due to extraordinary events or due to the individual performance of one or more members of the Board of Management and amend it as a result. This is done to obtain the final weighted overall target achievement.

The Supervisory Board did not make use of this option in financial year 2025.

The weighted overall target achievement is multiplied by the target amount to determine the payment amount. This is limited to 150 per cent of the target amount. The summary and the payment amount of the STI are presented in the following table:

STI 2025 – Summary & payment amount

	Target amount in € thousand	Target achievement STI in %	Discretionary factor	Overall target achievement in %	Payment amount in € thousand
Active Board of Management members					
Dr Lars Brzoska	608		1.0	50.61	308
Nadine Despineux	352		1.0	50.61	178
Dr Volker Hues	352	50.61	1.0	50.61	178
Maik Manthey	352		1.0	50.61	178
Heike Wulff	299		1.0	50.61	151
Resigned Board of Management members					
Udo Panenka ¹	352		1.0	50.61	178
Sabine Neuß ²	341	50.61	1.0	50.61	173

¹ Resignation of Udo Panenka from the Board of Management on 28 February 2025, end of employment contract on 31 March 2026.

² Resignation of Sabine Neuß from the Board of Management on 30 June 2024, end of employment contract on 31 December 2025.

6.2. Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)

Long-term incentive (LTI) 2025–2027

The LTI 2025–2027 is based on the currently valid remuneration system and helps secure the long-term development of Jungheinrich by rewarding the implementation of the corporate strategy and the long-term increase in the value of Jungheinrich: Success is assessed on the basis of financial, share-based and sustainable performance criteria that reflect the strategy and the social and environmental responsibility of Jungheinrich, as well as a discretionary factor.

The LTI is allocated every year as a tranche in the form of virtual performance shares. The target amount forms the basis for the allocation and amounts to 55 per cent of the basic remuneration for each member of the Board of Management. At the start of the term, the target amount is divided by the average share price of Jungheinrich AG (arithmetic mean of the closing prices in the last 120 trading days before the start of the performance period) to calculate the number of virtual shares assigned conditionally (virtual performance shares – VPSs). The LTI tranche allocated to the members of the Board of Management for financial year 2025 is shown in the table below.

LTI tranche 2025–2027 –

Allocation of the virtual performance shares (VPSs)

	Target amount in € thousand	Allocation price in €	Number of allocated VPSs
Active Board of Management members			
Dr Lars Brzoska	743		27,961.53
Nadine Despineux	430		16,175.84
Dr Volker Hues	430	26.57	16,175.84
Maik Manthey	430		16,175.84
Heike Wulff	365		13,749.46
Resigned Board of Management members			
Udo Panenka ¹	430	26.57	16,175.84
Sabine Neuß ²	417		15,704.62

¹ Resignation of Udo Panenka from the Board of Management on 28 February 2025, end of employment contract on 31 March 2026.

² Resignation of Sabine Neuß from the Board of Management on 30 June 2024, end of employment contract on 31 December 2025.

The final number of VPSs depends on the weighted overall target achievement, which is determined on the basis of the return on capital employed (ROCE), relative total shareholder return (relative TSR) and the lithium-ion equipment ratio performance criteria.

The target values for the performance criteria are set by the Supervisory Board, and the degree to which they have been achieved is decided by the Supervisory Board after the end of the performance period. The number of final VPSs is always limited to 150 per cent of the originally allocated VPSs.


Return on Capital Employed

ROCE is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) of the “Intralogistics” segment as per the consolidated financial statements and the capital employed in the segment in the respective financial year and is weighted at 60 per cent. The ROCE of the last financial year of the performance period, i.e. the ROCE of financial year 2027, is the relevant figure when determining whether the target for the 2025–2027 tranche has been met.



The calculation of the target achievement is illustrated by the following curve, which is interpolated on a linear basis between the threshold value, target value and cap:

Bonus curve – ROCE




Relative total shareholder return

The relative TSR compares the TSR performance of Jungheinrich with the TSR performance of an individual peer group and is weighted at 20 per cent. The TSR performance is the development of the share price plus dividends paid during the performance period. The peer group primarily includes German companies from the SDAX and MDAX that are comparable to Jungheinrich in terms of industry and size. Other comparable, stock-market-listed companies from Germany and continental European countries are also part of the peer group.

The TSR performance is determined for each company in the peer group and Jungheinrich after the performance period ends. The resulting individual values are subsequently ranked and given a percentile ranking, with the 0th percentile ranking corresponding to the lowest TSR performance and the 100th percentile ranking to the highest TSR performance. The following curve represents the calculation of the degree of target achievement, which is interpolated on a linear basis between the threshold value, target value and cap:

Bonus curve – relative TSR




Sustainability target

As with the STI, the non-financial sustainability target for the 2025–2027 tranche is the lithium-ion equipment ratio. The target value is based on the strategic planning in the lithium-ion battery division. Target achievement is measured by comparing the actual value achieved in the performance period with the target value. The lithium-ion equipment ratio is taken into account in the tranche with a weighting of 20 per cent.

The degree of target achievement is calculated as represented in the following curve, which is interpolated on a linear basis between the threshold value, target value and cap:

Bonus curve – sustainability target



The performance criteria and target values for the performance criteria may not be subsequently changed in principle. The Supervisory Board may take extraordinary developments into account as appropriate in accordance with the recommendation in G.11 of the German Corporate Governance Code in justified exceptional cases that are not related to the Board of Management’s performance. It may do so based on its prudent judgement when calculating the degrees of target achievement or by subsequently adjusting the LTI target values and performance criteria during the current performance period. Extraordinary developments include, for example, significant purchases or sales of companies, changes to tax or accounting regulations with substantial effects, and unforeseeable and far-reaching changes to the economic situation, but not unfavourable market developments.

If exceptional developments that require an adjustment as outlined above occur, corresponding details will be provided in the next remuneration report. From the Supervisory Board’s point of view, there was no reason to exercise the adjustment options outlined above in the LTI in financial year 2025.

Determining the LTI

After the end of the performance period, the final number of VPSs is determined by multiplying the conditionally allocated number of VPSs by the weighted overall target achievement. To determine the cash payout amount after the end of the performance period, the final number of VPSs is then multiplied by the average share price of Jungheinrich AG (arithmetic mean of the closing prices of the last 120 trading days before the end of the performance period). On an exceptional basis, the Supervisory Board can multiply the payment amount by a factor of between 0.8 and 1.2 in the form of a discretionary decision due to extraordinary events or due to the individual performance of one or more members of the Board of Management and amend it as a result. In all cases, the payment amount is limited to 180 per cent of the target amount.

LTI 2023–2025 (allocation in financial year 2023)

The members of the Board of Management were granted remuneration in financial year 2025 that resulted from the tranche of the LTI allocated in financial year 2023. The LTI for the 2023–2025 performance period is based on the current remuneration system.

The specification of the performance criteria at lower threshold, target value and cap as well as the target achievement is shown in the following table. The values represent the LTI 2023–2025 target values that were retroactively adjusted by the Supervisory Board in February 2024 as a result of the impacts of the war in Ukraine. In particular the very ambitious target values of the ROCE at that time no longer allowed for a realistic target achievement and therefore the intended steering effect of the remuneration system. A detailed explanation of the adjustments was already provided in the remuneration report for 2023.

In accordance with the provisions in the employment contracts, the disposal of the Russian subsidiary Jungheinrich Lift Truck 000 in financial year 2025 as well as the two acquisitions of Invar and Flexstore in the reporting year were taken into consideration, as with the procedure for the STI, when calculating the target achievement of the LTI 2023–2025. Detailed information on the adjustment of the key figures can also be found in the consolidated financial statements. In addition, further adjustments were also made when calculating the target achievement of the 2023–2025 tranche, which are attributable to acquisitions in 2023 (Storage Solutions Inc. and Magazino GmbH). This ensures that the target achievement of the LTI, explicitly the target achievement of the ROCE, is not influenced by one-off effects as part of the M&A transactions, but rather that the actual performance of the Board of Management is reflected. A comparative calculation of the target achievement before and after the adjustment of the ROCE to account for the M&A transactions is provided below in the interest of transparent disclosure.

The specific values for lower threshold, target value, cap and actual value for the lithium-ion equipment ratio are not provided at the present time, as in previous years and as is the case with the STI, as this would reveal detailed information about the strategic planning of Jungheinrich to its competition and might put the company at a considerable disadvantage. These values will be published in one of the subsequent remuneration reports.

Return on capital employed (ROCE)

ROCE is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) of the "Intralogistics" segment as per the consolidated financial statements and the capital employed in the segment in the respective financial year and, as with the 2025–2027 tranche, was weighted at 60 per cent. The ROCE of the last financial year of the performance period, i.e. the ROCE of financial year 2025, was the relevant figure when determining whether the target for the 2023–2025 tranche has been met.

The Supervisory Board adjusted ROCE for M&A transactions, as stipulated in the employment contract, for financial year 2025. As a result, the actual value of the ROCE changed from 8.34 per cent

(unadjusted) to 15.03 per cent (adjusted). The target achievement of the ROCE is thus 60.30 per cent for the LTI 2023–2025 (before adjusting for M&A transactions, 0.00 per cent).

Relative total shareholder return

The relative TSR was weighted at 20 per cent and the target achievement was calculated in accordance with the description provided above.

Lithium-ion equipment ratio

The non-financial sustainability target for the 2023–2025 tranche was the lithium-ion equipment ratio, as with the 2025–2027 tranche. The non-financial sustainability target was weighted at 20 per cent.

The target achievement for the performance criteria and the overall target achievement in the LTI for the 2023–2025 performance period are as follows in financial year 2025, although only the target achievement is provided for the lithium-ion equipment ratio for reasons of competitiveness:

Determining the LTI 2023–2025 payment amount

After the end of the performance period, the final number of VPSs is determined by multiplying the conditionally allocated number of VPSs by the weighted overall target achievement. To determine the cash payout amount after the end of the performance period, the final number of VPSs is then multiplied by the average share price of Jungheinrich AG (arithmetic mean of the closing prices of the last 120 trading days before the end of the performance period).

On an exceptional basis, the Supervisory Board can multiply the payment amount by a factor of between 0.8 and 1.2 in the form of a discretionary decision due to extraordinary events or due to the individual performance of one or more members of the Board of Management and amend it as a result.

The Supervisory Board did not make use of this option. In all cases, the payment amount is limited to 180 per cent of the target amount.

The following table includes the target amount, overall target achievement, discretionary factor and the corresponding payment amount for the LTI 2023–2025 for each active member of the Board of Management who was promised the LTI 2023–2025:

LTI tranche 2023–2025 – Specification of the performance criteria & target achievements

	Weighting	Lower threshold	Target value	Cap	Actual value	Target achievement
Return on capital employed (ROCE)	60%	14%	19%	24%	15.03	60.30%
Relative total shareholder return	20%	25 th percentile ranking	50 th percentile ranking	75 th percentile ranking	28.57 th percentile ranking	57.14%
Lithium-ion equipment ratio	20%	No information	No information	No information	No information	129.00%
Overall target achievement (weighted)						73.41%

LTI tranche 2023–2025 – Target achievement & payment amount

	Target amount in € thousand	Allocation price in €	Number of allocated VPSs	Overall target achievement in %	Final number of VPSs	Reference share price as of 31/12/2025 in €	Discretionary factor	Payment amount in € thousand
Active Board of Management members								
Dr Lars Brzoska	723	25.04	28,860.06	73.41	21,186.17	32.12	1.0	680
Dr Volker Hues	417		16,664.21		12,233.20		1.0	393
Resigned Board of Management member								
Sabine Neuß ¹	417	25.04	16,664.21	73.41	12,233.20	32.12	1.0	393
Former Board of Management member								
Christian Erlach ²	417	25.04	16,664.21	73.41	12,233.20	32.12	1.0	393

¹ Resignation of Sabine Neuß from the Board of Management on 30 June 2024, end of employment contract on 31 December 2025.

² Christian Erlach resigned from the Board of Management in financial year 2024.

7. Miscellaneous

Malus and clawback

The short-term variable remuneration and virtual performance shares are subject to malus and clawback conditions. For significant, deliberate or grossly negligent breaches of duty by the members of the Board of Management, the Supervisory Board is entitled to retain some of any as yet unpaid variable remuneration granted (malus) and to reclaim some of the variable remuneration already paid (clawback). The Supervisory Board's decision in this regard is based on its prudent judgement. In financial year 2025, the Supervisory Board did not retain or reclaim any variable remuneration components.

Compliance with the maximum remuneration

In addition to limiting the variable remuneration components, the Supervisory Board has set a maximum remuneration pursuant to Section 87a, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2, Item 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act, limiting the remuneration that is granted for a financial year. This maximum remuneration comprises the basic remuneration, fringe benefits, pension and payments under the STI and LTI. The maximum remuneration for the Chairman of the Board of Management is €3.5 million and for the ordinary members of the Board of Management €2.3 million each.

Regarding the basic remuneration, fringe benefits, retirement benefits, event-related remuneration components and the payout from the STI for financial year 2025, the rule on maximum remuneration was adhered to without having to reduce any component. As the payment for the long-term variable remuneration is not available until the second year after the end of the reporting year given the three-year performance period, compliance with the maximum remuneration for financial year 2025 can only be conclusively reported on in the remuneration report for financial

year 2027. The Supervisory Board had already set an upper limit for remuneration for financial year 2023 for each member of the Board of Management active in 2023. With the end of the performance period for the 2023–2025 multi-year variable remuneration on 31 December 2025, it has been determined that none of the members of the Board of Management active in 2023 as well as those who have since resigned or former members achieved or exceeded the upper limit for remuneration.

Maximum remuneration pursuant to Section 87a, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2, Item 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act – financial year 2023

	Dr Lars Brzoska Chairman of the Board of Management	Dr Volker Hues Member of the Board of Management, Finance	Sabine Neuß ¹ Resigned Board of Management member	Christian Erlach ² Former Board of Management member
in € thousand				
Basic remuneration 2023	1,314	759	759	759
Fringe benefits 2023	9	9	15	9
STI 2023	739	427	427	427
LTI tranche 2023–2025	680	393	393	393
Total remuneration	2,742	1,588	1,593³	1,587³
Maximum remuneration pursuant to Section 87a of the German Stock Corporation Act	3,500	2,300	2,300	2,300

¹ Resignation of Sabine Neuß from the Board of Management on 30 June 2024, end of employment contract on 31 December 2025.

² Christian Erlach resigned from the Board of Management in financial year 2024.

³ The amount shown differs from the total of the individual remuneration components due to rounding differences.

Benefits in the event of premature termination of membership of the Board of Management

In the event of a premature termination of the appointment as members of the Board of Management or the employment contract, any payments to the member of the Board of Management that may be required (in the absence of cause as defined in Section 626 of the German Civil Code), including fringe benefits, should not exceed the value of the basic remuneration, STI remuneration and LTI remuneration for two years or the value of the remuneration for the remaining term of the employment contract (severance cap).

In financial year 2025, Dr Volker Hues and Udo Panenka resigned prematurely from their positions on the Board of Management in agreement with the Supervisory Board.

Dr Volker Hues resigned from his position on the Board of Management with effect from the end of 31 December 2025. The corresponding provisions of the succession planning agreement from financial year 2023 will be applied. The basic and variable remuneration as well as the fringe benefits and pension commitment will continue to be paid until the regular end of the

employment contract on 31 March 2027. The amount for the basic remuneration is contained in full in the remuneration granted and owed for financial year 2025 presented in the table in chapter I. C. 1. The portion of variable remuneration relating to the STI 2026 and STI 2027 as well as the LTI tranches 2025–2027, 2026–2028 and 2027–2029 is dependent on the development of the underlying performance criteria in each case. In addition, the LTI is largely dependent on the performance of the Jungheinrich share price during the regular performance period. As a result, it will not be possible to report on these variable remuneration components as granted remuneration until after the end of the relevant performance period. In addition, provisions for pensions of €1,748 thousand were formed as part of the company pension agreed with Dr Volker Hues.

Udo Panenka resigned from his position on the Board of Management with effect from the end of 28 February 2025. The corresponding provisions of the termination agreement from financial year 2025 will be applied. The basic and variable remuneration, the fringe benefits, other event-related remuneration components (on which further details are provided in chapter I. B. 5.) and the maintenance payment will continue to be paid until the

termination date on 31 March 2026. The amounts for the basic remuneration, the maintenance payment and other event-related remuneration components are contained in full in the remuneration granted and owed for financial year 2025 presented in the table in chapter I. C. 1. The portion of variable remuneration relating to the STI 2026 as well as the LTI 2025–2027 and 2026–2028 is dependent on the development of the underlying performance criteria in each case. In addition, the LTI is largely dependent on the performance of the Jungheinrich share price during the regular performance period. As a result, it will not be possible to report on these variable remuneration components as granted remuneration until after the end of the relevant performance period.

A termination agreement was also concluded with Sabine Neuß, who resigned from office by mutual agreement on 30 June 2024. This agreement governs a regular continued payment of the basic and variable remuneration as well as the fringe benefits and pension commitment until the end of her employment contract on 31 December 2025. The remuneration granted and owed as part of these termination agreements is disclosed in detail in chapter I. C. 2.

C. Amount of Board of Management remuneration in financial year 2025

1. Remuneration of the members of the Board of Management active in the financial year

The **target remuneration** for financial year 2025 is made up of the following components:

- **Basic remuneration:** Amount promised for financial year 2025
- **Fringe benefits:** Amount promised for financial year 2025
- **Pension expense:** Amount set aside in financial year 2025 (pension expense) or maintenance payment promised in financial year 2025
- **STI:** Target amount for financial year 2025 (2025 performance period) based on 100 per cent target achievement

- **LTI:** Target amount for financial year 2025 (2025–2027 performance period) based on 100 per cent target achievement and constant share price
- **Miscellaneous:** Other event-related remuneration components

The target remuneration in financial year 2025 for the members of the Board of Management is as follows:

Target remuneration in financial year 2025

	Dr Lars Brzoska Chairman of the Board of Management since 01/09/2019		Nadine Despineux Member of the Board of Management, Sales since 15/07/2024		Dr Volker Hues Member of the Board of Management, Finance since 01/04/2009		Maik Manthey Member of the Board of Management, Technics since 01/07/2024		Heike Wulff Member of the Board of Management, Designated CFO since 01/05/2024		Udo Panenka ¹ Resigned member of the Board of Management, Automation until 28/02/2025	
	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %
Basic remuneration	1,351	48.4	781	44.6	781	49.7	781	44.6	664	44.7	781	42.0
Fringe benefits	9	0.3	10	0.6	9	0.6	10	0.6	6	0.4	13	0.7
Company pension / Maintenance payment	77	2.8	180	10.3	0	0.0	180	10.3	153	10.3	180	9.7
Total non-performance-related remuneration	1,437	51.6³	971	55.4³	791³	50.3	971	55.4³	823	55.3³	974	52.3³
Single-year variable remuneration (STI)	608	21.8	352	20.1	352	22.4	352	20.1	299	20.1	352	18.9
Multi-year variable remuneration (LTI)	743	26.6	430	24.5	430	27.3	430	24.5	365	24.6	430	23.1
Total performance-related remuneration	1,351	48.4	781³	44.6	781³	49.7	781³	44.6	664	44.7	781³	42.0
Miscellaneous remuneration ²	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	106 ⁴	5.7
Target total remuneration	2,788	100.0³	1,752³	100.0³	1,572	100.0	1,752³	100.0³	1,487	100.0³	1,862	100.0³

¹ Udo Panenka resigned from the Board of Management at the end of 28 February, while Udo Panenka's employment contract remains in place beyond the end of the reporting period. As a result, the remuneration presented for Udo Panenka relates to the full calendar year.

² Miscellaneous remuneration comprises all remuneration that is not represented in any of the other remuneration components.

³ The amount shown differs from the total of the individual remuneration components due to rounding differences.

⁴ The remuneration of Udo Panenka detailed under miscellaneous remuneration comprises the other event-related remuneration components (see chapter I. B. 5. Other event-related remuneration components).

Remuneration granted and owed in financial year 2025

The following table shows the remuneration granted and owed to the members of the Board of Management in financial year 2025. For the definitions of granted and owed remuneration, please refer to chapter I. B. 6. "Performance-related remuneration".

The **remuneration granted and owed** pursuant to Section 162, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act is made up of the following components for financial year 2025:

- **Basic remuneration:** Amount granted in financial year 2025
- **Fringe benefits:** Amount granted in financial year 2025
- **STI:** Amount granted for financial year 2025 (2025 performance period) in accordance with target achievement; payment in financial year 2026
- **LTI:** Amount of the LTI tranche granted whose performance periods ended in financial year 2025 (performance period 2023–2025); payment in financial year 2026

- **Maintenance payment:** Maintenance payment for financial year 2025
- **Miscellaneous:** Other event-related remuneration components

The remuneration granted and owed to the members of the Board of Management in financial year 2025 pursuant to Section 162, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act is as follows:

Remuneration granted and owed in financial year 2025

	Dr Lars Brzoska Chairman of the Board of Management since 01/09/2019		Nadine Despineux Member of the Board of Management, Sales since 15/07/2024		Dr Volker Hues ¹ Member of the Board of Management, Finance since 01/04/2009		Maik Manthey Member of the Board of Management, Technics since 01/07/2024		Heike Wulff Member of the Board of Management, Designated CFO since 01/05/2024		Udo Panenka ² Resigned member of the Board of Management, Automation until 28/02/2025	
	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %
Basic remuneration	1,351	57.5	781	68.0	1,758	75.2	781	68.0	664	68.2	977	65.1
Fringe benefits	9	0.4	10	0.9	9	0.4	10	0.9	6	0.6	13	0.9
Company pension / Maintenance payment	–	–	180	15.6	–	–	180	15.6	153	15.7	225	15.0
Total non-performance-related remuneration	1,360	57.9	971	84.5	1,768⁴	75.6	971	84.5	823	84.5	1,214⁴	81.0
Single-year variable remuneration (STI)	308	13.1	178	15.5	178	7.6	178	15.5	151	15.5	178	11.9
Multi-year variable remuneration (LTI)	680	29.0	0	0.0	393	16.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total performance-related remuneration	988	42.1	178	15.5	571	24.4	178	15.5	151	15.5	178	11.9
Miscellaneous remuneration ³	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	108 ⁵	7.2
Total remuneration (pursuant to Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act)	2,348	100.0	1,149	100.0	2,339⁴	100.0	1,149	100.0	974	100.0	1,500⁴	100.0⁴
Company pension service cost	77	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	2,425	–	1,149	–	2,339	–	1,149	–	974	–	1,500	–

¹ Dr Volker Hues resigned from the Board of Management at the end of 31 December, while Dr Volker Hues's employment contract remains in place beyond the end of the reporting period. The basic remuneration granted and owed to Dr Volker Hues comprises the remuneration for financial years 2025 to 2027 as part of the succession planning agreement (see chapter I. B. 7. Miscellaneous).

² Udo Panenka resigned from the Board of Management at the end of 28 February, while Udo Panenka's employment contract remains in place beyond the end of the reporting period. As a result, the remuneration presented for Udo Panenka relates to the full 2025 calendar year and includes the remuneration as part of the termination agreement for financial year 2025 (see chapter I. B. 7. Miscellaneous). The basic remuneration granted and owed, the maintenance payment and the miscellaneous remuneration comprises the remuneration for financial years 2025 and 2026.

³ Miscellaneous remuneration comprises all remuneration that is not represented in any of the other remuneration components.

⁴ The amount shown differs from the total of the individual remuneration components due to rounding differences.

⁵ The remuneration of Udo Panenka detailed under miscellaneous remuneration comprises the other event-related remuneration components (see chapter I. B. 5. Other event-related remuneration components).

Review of the customary nature of Board of Management remuneration

To ensure market-standard, competitive remuneration, the Supervisory Board reviews the remuneration amounts of the Board of Management every two years. As part of the review, the degree to which the remuneration is horizontally standard (comparison with Board of Management remuneration at other companies) and vertically standard (remuneration and employment conditions within Jungheinrich) is examined and assessed. For horizontal comparison, companies that are comparable with Jungheinrich, particularly with regard to country, sector and size, are used. Within Jungheinrich, top-level management and the company's overall workforce are used for the vertical comparison both for current ratios and for ratios as they have developed over time.

The customary nature of Board of Management remuneration at a horizontal level was reviewed in financial year 2024. In order to assess the horizontal customary nature, a peer group was formed primarily of German companies from the SDAX and MDAX that are comparable in terms of industry and the size criteria of revenue, employees and market capitalisation. Other comparable, stock-market-listed companies from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Finland as well as non-stock-market-listed companies from Germany were also part of the peer group. Based on this review of the customary nature of the market, it was established that, although the remuneration is customary in principle, there is potential with regard to competitiveness. As a result, the Supervisory Board has decided to adjust the basic remuneration as well as the STI and LTI of members of the Board of Management by 3 per cent for financial year 2025. Ms Wulff's remuneration has been increased by a further 22 per cent from financial year 2025 onwards due to her assuming additional

responsibilities. This adjustment reflects the expanded role and the increased demands connected with this.

The vertical – internal – customary nature was reviewed in financial year 2025. Average per capita remuneration of senior management and average per capita remuneration of the workforce over time were used to assess the vertical customary nature of remuneration.

2. Remuneration of resigned and former members of the Board of Management

The remuneration of former members of the Board of Management and those who resigned before the current reporting period amounted to a total of €2,796 thousand in financial year 2025.

Sabine Neuß resigned from the Board of Management with effect from 30 April 2024. Her employment contract was not terminated but rather continued until its regular expiration on 31 December 2025. The remuneration of Sabine Neuß amounted to €1,272 thousand in financial year 2025. Of this, €695 thousand related to basic remuneration, in which the fringe income earned from consultancy activities in financial year 2025 in the amount of €64 thousand is already included and offset. Due to her premature resignation from office, the basic remuneration of Sabine Neuß was already recorded as granted and owed in the remuneration report for 2024. A further €12 thousand relates to fringe benefits. The fixed remuneration components account for 55.5 per cent. In addition, €173 thousand relates to the STI 2025 and €393 thousand to the LTI 2023–2025, with the result that the variable portion accounts for 44.5 per cent. The portion of remuneration relating to the LTI 2024–2026 as well as LTI 2025–2027 is largely dependent on the performance of the Jungheinrich share price and other performance criteria during

the regular performance period. As a result, it will not be possible to report on these variable remuneration components as granted remuneration until after the end of the relevant performance period. The service cost for the company pension was €126 thousand in financial year 2025. As of 31 December 2025, the provisions for pensions formed for Sabine Neuß were €735 thousand.

For Christian Erlach, who resigned in financial year 2024, the remuneration granted and owed in financial year 2025 amounted to €445 thousand. Of this, €393 thousand related to the LTI 2023–2025 and €52 thousand to retirement benefits. The variable portion was therefore 88.3 per cent and the fixed portion 11.7 per cent. The portion of remuneration relating to the LTI 2024–2026 is largely dependent on the performance of the Jungheinrich share price and other performance criteria during the regular performance period. As a result, it will not be possible to report on this variable remuneration component as granted remuneration until after the end of the performance period.

The remuneration granted and owed to Klaus-Dieter Rosenbach, who left in financial year 2020, amounted to €73 thousand for financial year 2025 and consists entirely of retirement benefits. The remuneration granted and owed to Hans-Georg Frey, who left the Board of Management in financial year 2019, amounted to €85 thousand for financial year 2025 and consists entirely of retirement benefits.

The remaining payments were attributable to former members of the Board of Management who left the Board of Management of Jungheinrich more than ten years ago, as well as their surviving dependants. Provisions for pensions for former members of the Board of Management and their surviving dependants amounted to €12,916 thousand according to IFRS.

II. REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD

A. Remuneration system in financial year 2025

According to the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting of 20 May 2025, the members of the Supervisory Board only receive fixed remuneration. This consists of annual fixed basic remuneration and additional fixed remuneration for participation in committees, due after the end of the respective financial year.

The basic remuneration and the committee remuneration are intended to attract highly qualified members to the Supervisory Board and to retain their services for the company. They are also intended to provide suitable recompense for the additional time needed to perform the associated activities. In this way, the Supervisory Board can monitor the work of the Board of Management and act in an advisory capacity when strategy is developed. The remuneration system for the Supervisory Board was adjusted for financial year 2025 in the interest of competitiveness and is as follows:

Fixed basic remuneration of the Supervisory Board members			
Chair of the Supervisory Board	Deputy Chair of the Supervisory Board	Other Supervisory Board members	
€189,000	€92,000	€56,000	
Additional remuneration for membership in a committee			
Finance and Audit Committee		Personnel Committee	
Chair	Member	Chair	Member
€75,000	€30,000	€50,000	€25,000

Supervisory Board members receive pro rata basic and committee remuneration if they join or leave the Supervisory Board during the year. The pro rata calculation refers to the quarters begun in which a Supervisory Board member has been a member of the Supervisory Board or in which a Supervisory Board member has

been a member of a committee that comes with remuneration. Jungheinrich also reimburses expenses incurred and premiums for directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) at an appropriate amount.

B. Remuneration granted and owed in financial year 2025

This chapter provides an overview of the remuneration granted and owed in financial year 2025. The remuneration granted represents remuneration for which the single-year activity on which the remuneration is based has been fully performed. Remuneration is owed if Jungheinrich has a legally existing obligation towards the Supervisory Board member that is due but has not yet been fulfilled.

The remuneration granted and owed to the members of the Supervisory Board for financial year 2025 is as follows, broken down by remuneration component:

Supervisory Board remuneration in financial year 2025

	Fixed basic remuneration		Committee remuneration		Total remuneration
	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand	in %	in € thousand
Rolf Najork (Chairman)	189	79.1	50	20.9	239
Markus Haase ¹ (Deputy Chairman)	92	78.6	25	21.4	117
Antoinette P. Aris	56	50.5	55	49.5	111
Rainer Breitschädel ¹	56	100.0	–	0.0	56
Kathrin Elisabeth Dahnke	56	42.7	75	57.3	131
Isaf Gün ¹	56	100.0	–	0.0	56
Beate Klose	56	100.0	–	0.0	56
Eva Kohn ¹	56	100.0	–	0.0	56
Wolff Lange	56	69.1	25	30.9	81
Mike Retz ¹	56	100.0	–	0.0	56
Steffen Schwarz ¹	56	50.5	55	49.5	111
Andreas Wolf	56	69.1	25	30.9	81
Overall total remuneration	841	73.1	310	26.9	1,151

¹ Employee representative.

C. Review of Supervisory Board remuneration

To ensure market-standard, competitive remuneration, the Supervisory Board reviewed the remuneration amounts of the Supervisory Board in financial year 2024. As part of the review, the degree to which the remuneration is horizontally standard (comparison with Supervisory Board remuneration at other companies) was examined. The peer group to assess the degree to which Supervisory Board remuneration is horizontally standard was formed in a similar way to the one set up to assess Board of Management remuneration, namely comparable in terms of industry and the size criteria of revenue, employees and market capitalisation. As a result, it was established that, although the remuneration is customary in principle, there is potential for optimisation with regard to competitiveness. In order to give due consideration to this, the fixed basic remuneration of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board was increased by approximately 15 per cent, that of his deputy by approximately 12 per cent and that of the other Supervisory Board members by approximately 2 per cent from financial year 2025 onwards.

III. COMPARATIVE PRESENTATION OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS TREND

The following table shows the development of the remuneration granted and owed to members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board in the financial year, the earnings trend of Jungheinrich and the Jungheinrich Group as well as the development of workforce remuneration compared to the preceding financial year. The remuneration granted and owed to members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board corresponds to the remuneration granted and owed as presented in the chapters above. The earnings trend of Jungheinrich is presented using the financial indicators "net profit for the year of Jungheinrich AG" and "EBT of the Jungheinrich Group". The workforce remuneration is based on the average remuneration of the Jungheinrich Group's salaried employees and workers in Germany (excluding trainees, apprentices and interns). To ensure comparability, the remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

¹ Sabine Neuß resigned from the Board of Management at the end of 30 June 2024, while Sabine Neuß's employment contract remains in place until the end of the reporting period. The previous year's figure already included the basic remuneration granted and owed for financial year 2025 and is no longer included in the figure for the reporting period.

² Employee representative.

³ No information: newly elected to the Supervisory Board in financial year 2025.

⁴ Average remuneration of the Jungheinrich Group's salaried employees and workers in Germany (excluding trainees, apprentices and interns) extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

Comparative presentation

Total remuneration granted and owed	2025 in € thousand	2025 vs 2024 in %	2024 vs 2023 in %	2023 vs 2022 in %	2022 vs 2021 in %
Active Board of Management members					
Dr Lars Brzoska	2,348	2.7	-14.8	20.6	-22.9
Nadine Despineux	1,149	95.1	-	-	-
Dr Volker Hues	2,339	76.2	-14.6	17.9	-26.2
Maik Manthey	1,149	81.0	-	-	-
Heike Wulff	974	64.7	-	-	-
Resigned Board of Management members					
Sabine Neuß (until 06/2024)	514 ¹	-75.4 ¹	34.0	16.1	-13.3
Udo Panenka (until 02/2025)	1,500	41.5	-	-	-
Former Board of Management members					
Christian Erlach (until 12/2024)	445	-66.3	-14.9	18.7	-27.8
Hans-Georg Frey (until 08/2019)	85	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.0
Dr Klaus-Dieter Rosenbach (until 03/2020)	73	0.0	1.4	1.4	0.0
Supervisory Board					
Rolf Najork (Chairman)	239	11.2	33.3	-	-
Markus Haase ² (Deputy Chairman)	117	8.3	-	-	-
Antoinette P. Aris	111	0.9	-	-	-
Rainer Breitschädel ²	56	1.8	-	-	-
Kathrin Elisabeth Dahnke	131	0.8	-	300.0	-
Isaf Gün ²	56	- ³	-	-	-
Beate Klose	56	1.8	-	-	-
Eva Kohn ²	56	1.8	300.0	-	-
Wolff Lange	81	1.3	-	-	-
Mike Retz ²	56	1.8	-	-	-
Steffen Schwarz ²	111	0.9	-	-	-
Andreas Wolf	81	1.3	-	-	-
Earnings trend					
Net profit for the year of Jungheinrich AG	90,210	-64.3	1.2	126.4	8.9
EBT of the Jungheinrich Group	196,417	-51.4	1.3	15.0	-0.6
Average workforce remuneration					
Workforce (Jungheinrich Group in Germany) ⁴	80	3.1	4.4	5.4	1.4

IV. AUDITOR'S REPORT

To Jungheinrich Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg

Opinion

We formally audited the remuneration report of Jungheinrich Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg, for the financial year from 1 January to 31 December 2025 to examine whether the disclosures required under Section 162, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act were made in the remuneration report. In accordance with Section 162, Paragraph 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act, we did not audit the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the disclosures required under Section 162, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act were made in the enclosed remuneration report in all material aspects. Our opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

Basis for the opinion

We conducted our audit of the remuneration report in accordance with Section 162, Paragraph 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act while taking account of IDW Audit Standard: Auditing the Remuneration Report in accordance with Section 162, Paragraph 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act (IDW PS 870 (09/2023)). Our responsibilities under this requirement and this standard are

further described in the "Public Auditor's Responsibilities" section of our report. As an audit firm, we applied the requirements of IDW Quality Control Standard: Requirements regarding Quality Control in Audit Firms (IDW QMS 1 (09/2022)). We complied with the professional obligations pursuant to the German Law Regulating the Profession of Wirtschaftsprüfer (public auditors) and the code of professional conduct for public auditors / sworn accountants including the requirements regarding independence.

Responsibilities of management and the Supervisory Board

Management and the Supervisory Board are responsible for preparing the remuneration report, including the associated disclosures, that meets the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act. In addition, they are responsible for such internal control as they deem necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the associated disclosures, that is free from material misstatement due to fraudulent acts (i.e. manipulation of accounts or damage to assets) or error.

Public auditor's responsibilities

Our objective is to obtain reasonable certainty as to whether the disclosures required under Section 162, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the

German Stock Corporation Act were made in the remuneration report in all material aspects and to issue a corresponding audit opinion in a report.

We planned and conducted our audit in such a way that we were able to establish the formal completeness of the remuneration report by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required under Section 162, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act. In accordance with Section 162, Paragraph 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act, we did not audit the accuracy of the disclosures or the completeness of the individual disclosures in terms of their content, or the appropriate presentation of the remuneration report.

Hamburg, 12 March 2026

PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Thorsten Dzulko	Harald van Voorst
Wirtschaftsprüfer	Wirtschaftsprüfer
[German Public Auditor]	[German Public Auditor]

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